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RONALD A. KAISER* and JAMES E. FLETCHER**

State Policies and Practices in Coal
Severance Taxation***
ABSTRACT
The renewed emphasis on coal as an energy source has sparked
state interests in coal severance taxation. While a wealth of comparativegeologic and economic information exists on coal reserves,
there is a paucity of data on state coal severance tax policies and
practices. The authors endeavor to produce a comparative data base
by surveying state tax officials regarding existing tax practices.Although responses from these tax officials reveal variations in coal
severance tax bases, rates, revenue yields, expenditure policies, and
justificationsfor the tax, several patternsemerge. Revenue enhancement is the major justificationfor the tax, but it is often linked to
other economic considerations. Tax rates are based on either the
volume or the value of coal mined. Revenues are most often allocated
to specialfunds focusing on the external costs of coal production.
INTRODUCTION

State taxation of mineral resources is an established practice that has
become increasingly important-and controversial-in environmental,
energy, and fiscal policies. Escalating energy costs, oil embargoes, fluctuating domestic production, and rising costs of state governmental services have all contributed to a renewed interest in coal taxation.
As early as the 1900s, several eastern states began taxing the removal
of coal.' Since those early efforts, the practice has expanded to other
minerals.' As many as thirty states have mineral severance taxes,3 and
*Attorney & Associate Professor, Texas A&M University, Institute of Renewable Natural Resources.

*Associate Professor, California State University at Chico.
***Partial funding for the research provided by Center for Energy and Mineral Resources, Texas
A&M University. Dennis Bums and Patsy Meehan assisted with the research.
I. In 1913, Pennsylvania passed a statute imposing a 212% tax on authracite coal. PENN ACT
1913, P.L. No. 639. This statute was subsequently challenged and its constitutionality affirmed in
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia also
instituted coal severance taxes.
2. Metallic, non-metallic and energy minerals are subject to severance taxation. A partial listing
includes: coal, copper, gold, iron, lead, lignite, molybdenum, natural gas, oil, oil shale, potash,
tungsten, trona, silver, uranium, and zinc. State severance taxes on mineral resources are related,
among other things, to the industrial structure of the extractive industry, the tax structure of the state
and geographic resource patterns. See Gillis, Severance Taxes on North American Energy Resources:
A Tate of Two Minerals, 10 GRowTH AND CHANGE 55 (1979); McLure, Economic Constraints on
State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources. 31 NAT'L. TAX J. 257 (1978).

3. Oil and natural gas are the most frequently taxed resources with twenty-eight states imposing
a severance tax. Included in this group are Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ind.,
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nineteen states impose a severance tax on coal.' Among the major coalproducing states, only Illinois and Pennsylvania do not levy a coal severance tax. Mineral severance taxes are based on the quantity of the
resource extracted or on the dollar value of the resource at the time and
place of extraction.'
Research on mineral severance taxation has focused extensively on the
effects of such taxes on the economics of mining.6 Until recently, very
few articles have addressed severance taxation and state tax policy. 7 Even
fewer studies have reviewed the policy implications for the coal taxing
states.' This paper describes coal severance tax rates, revenue policies,
and practices for all states that levy such a tax. 9 The purpose of the paper
is to establish. a comparative information base for coal severance tax
policies and practices. Great diversity exists among state severance tax
Kan., Ky., La., Mich., Miss., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M.. N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Or., S.D.,
Tenn., Tex., Utah, and Wyo. Severance taxes are not limited to mineral resources as a number of
states impose the tax on forest products. Ala., Ark.. La., Miss., N.C.. N.M., Ore., and Va. have
a timber severance tax. 2 ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) §§45-000 to -955 (1981).
4. Ala., ALA. CODE §§ 40-13-1 to -36 (1977); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.65.010 to.060 (1983);
Ark., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-2101 to -2603 (1980 repla.); Colo., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-29-101
to -114 (1982 repla.); Idaho, IDAHO CODE. §§47-1201 to -1208 (1987, Cum. Supp.); Kan., KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§79-4216 to -4229 (1984); Ky., Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 143.010 to .990 (1986, Cum.
Supp.); La., LA. STAT. ANN. §§47.631 to .646 (1987, Cum. Supp.); Md., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81
§468 and N.R. §7-508 (1983, repl. vol.); Mont., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -205 (1985);
Nev., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 362.100 to .240 (1986); N.M., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-26-1 to -I I (1986,
Cum. Supp.); N.D., N.D. CENT. CODE §§57-61-01 to -10 (1985, Cum. Supp.); Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§5749.01 to .99 (1986, Cum. Supp.); Okla., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45 §§931 to 938
(1987, Cum. Supp.); S.D., S.D. C.L. §§ 10-39A-1 to -21 (1982, rev.); Tenn., TENN. CODE ANN.
§§67-7-101 to -110 (1983, repla.); W.Va., W. VA. CODE §§ 11-13A-3 to -6 (1986, Cum. Supp.);
Wyo., Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-6-301 to -307 (1977).
5. Steele, Natural Resource Taxation: Resource Allocation and Distributions, EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES AND TAXATION 233, 246 (M. Gaffney ed. 1967). E.g., quantity rate, OHIO REV. CODE § 5749.02;
value rate, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 39-6-302.
6. See Lockner, The Economic Effect of Severance Tax on Decisions of the Mining Firm, 4 NAT.
RES. . 468 (1965); A. CHURCH, TAXATION OF NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES, 2 (1981); Bumess, On
the Taxation of Nonreplenishable Resources, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 289 (1976).
7. For a partial listing see Blackstone, Mineral Severance Taxes in Western States, 75 CoLo. SCH
OF MINES 1 (1980); C. DUMARS & L. BROWN, LEGAL ISSUES INSTATE TAXATION OF ENERGY DEVELOpMENT 7 (1979); Morgan & Nelson, Nonneutral Features of Energy Taxation, 20 NAT. RES. .
853 (1980); Richardson & Scott, Resource Location Patterns and State Severance Taxes: Some
Empirical Evidence, 23 NAT. RES. J. 351 (1983); Shelton & Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax
Exportation and Regional Energy Policies, 17 NAT. RES. J. 261 (1977); Van Baalen, Mineral Export
Legislation-Can it Withstand Federal Preemption and Commerce Clause Challenges?, 12 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 131 (1977).

8. For a theoretical basis for state coal severance taxation see Comment, An Outline for Development of Cost-Based State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RES. J. 913 (1980). See also, Desai & Orbin,
The Coal Severance Tax Policy and Practice in Ten States, 4 ENVTL. PROF. 65 (1982); Note, The
Increasing Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Policy, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 675 (1979) [hereinafter Increasing Conflict].
9. Data for this paper was collected from a survey questionnaire mailed to the state comptroller
or chief state tax officer in each state. Telephone interviews with state officials were conducted as
necessary for data clarification. Responses regarding state taxes were verified based on the author's
examination of COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, STATE TAX GUIDES By TAXES BY STATE (1984).
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rates and tax practices, therefore, readers should be cautious in comparing

revenue figures.
FEDERAL AND STATE POSITIONS
During the energy crisis of the 1970s, historical trends in energy uses,
prices, and expectations about the future costs of non-renewable resources
were revised.' Rapidly rising oil prices in 1973 and 1974 offered hard
evidence of an impending crisis in supply and demand, which was further

escalated by the 1974 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
[OPEC] oil embargo. This trauma stimulated the introduction of state and
federal legislation on energy policy, taxation, and pricing. " Policymaking
at the state level has contributed to the evolution of federal energy policy. 2
At the state level, severance tax debates increased, particularly in the
energy-wealthy western states where legislators became aware of energy
supply and demand conditions and the associated social and economic
costs related to energy development. 3 The policy position towards coal14
development during the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations
generated severance tax legislation in several states, and intensive debate
on the merits of severance taxes in nonseverance tax states.' 5 Conflicts
between the energy-consuming states and energy-producing states over
the severance tax issue have escalated in recent years.' 6 A 1976 report
issued by the Rand Corporation concluded that "the emerging pattern of
state coal tax policy in the Northern Great Plains is one of OPEC-like
revenue maximization. '
supra note 6, at I.
II. One indication of that trauma was a congressional bill that sought to impose a ceiling on
state severance taxes on coal. H.R. REP, No. 5294, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 24,565
(1979). See also Increasing Conflict, supra note 8.
12. For a discussion of this relationship see, Light, Federalism and the Energy Crisis: A View
From the States, 6 PUBLIUS 81 (1976); Regens, State Policy Response to the Energy Question: An
Analysis of Innovation, 6t Soc. Sci. Q. 45 (1980); Fitzsimmons, State Energy Policymaking, 23
NAT. RES. J. 306 (1983).
13. See JOINT CONF. COMM. ON COAL TAXATION, STATEMENT, MONTANA LEGISLATURE, Apr. 16,
1975.
14. For a trenchant criticism of federal coal policy see, Tarlock, The Making of Federal Coal
Policy: Lessons for Public Lands Management from a Failed Program. An Essay and Review, 25
NAT. RES. J.349 (1985).
15. Desai, supra note 8.
16. "Energy producing states" are those which export significant amounts of non-renewable energy
resources to other states. Included in this group are La., Tex. N.M., Wyo., Mont. and N.D. "Energy
consuming states" are those which import more nonrenewable resources than they can produce.
Included in this group are Mich., N.Y., N.J., Fla., & Mass. See, Shelton & Vogta, The Incidence
of Coal Severance Taxes: Political Perceptions and Economic Realities, 22 NAT. RES. J.539, 549
(1982). For production figures on oil and natural gas, see AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE INBASIC
PETROLEUM DATA BOOK, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY STATISTICS, No. 1,§ IV, TABLES 5 and § XIII, TABLE
9b (May 1981).
17. NEHRIG AND ZYCHER, COAL DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION IN THE NORTHERN
GREAT PLAINS 148 (1976).
10. CHURCH,
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Although a concensus on a national energy policy has yet to materialize,
several federal tax and regulatory policies have been established to further
the multiple goals of:
(1) Expanding conventional domestic oil and gas production;
(2) Decreasing reliance on foreign oil sources;
(3) Increasing development of coal, nuclear, synthetic, and other
domestic energy sources;
(4) Reducing demand through energy conservation."
Policy shifts were implemented through price deregulation on oil, modifications in the oil depletion allowance, establishment of the windfall
profits tax, income tax incentives for energy conservation and solar energy
development, and a federal coal leasing program.
The federal government entered the severance tax controversy in two
areas, with actions characterized as schizophrenic in the pursuit of multiple goals.' 9 On the congressional side, the United States Senate held
hearings to place a maximum twelve and one-half percent limit on severance taxes levied by state or local governments on coal mined from
federal lands for shipment in interstate commerce.' The bill reflected a
concern among coal-consuming states that Montana's thirty percent coal
severance tax was resulting in millions of dollars of added costs to consumers. On the judicial side, the United States Supreme Court ruled on
the constitutionality of the Montana severance tax in Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. State of Montana.2 At the heart of the controversy over
the Montana severance tax is the meaning of the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause includes among
the powers of Congress, the authority "to regulate commerce among the
Several States." These few words indicate, according to the United States
22
Supreme Court, that states do not have the unbrindled discretion to tax.
The Court has consistently ruled that state legislation which impedes
interstate commerce and is economically discriminatory violates this clause.'
In Commonwealth Edison,24 however, the court held that a thirty percent
maximum severance tax25 on the contract sales price of coal is not an
18. President Carter's national energy plan sought to decrease our dependence on imported oil,
encourage energy conservation and encourage development of domestic energy supplies. Executive
Office of the President, National Energy Plan xi-xii, 65 (1977).
19. CHURCH, supra note 6, at I.
20. Coal Severance Tax, Hearings on S. 2695 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy & Natural
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REC. I1, 192 (1980).
21. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
22. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); c.f. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260
U.S. 245 (1922).
23. Hunt v. Washington State Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
24. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979).
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unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, notwithstanding that ninety
percent of Montana's coal is shipped out of state.
The federal government's attempts to moderate severance tax conflicts
between energy-producing and energy-consuming states cannot be classified as successful.26 If the 1970s were characterized as a decade of increased federal and state awareness of tax and regulatory impacts on
energy development, there is little doubt that the 1980s will be a decade
of battles for control of resource wealth between producers, consumers,
owners, and the federal and state governments.
STATE COAL SEVERANCE TAXES
The following sections describe the diversity of state coal severance
tax practices and policies. Policy justifications, tax bases and rates, revenue collections and allocations are summarized, as of January 1, 1985,
for the nineteen states that have enacted coal severance taxes.2 7 Four of
these states2" did not have commercial coal mines in operation as of 1985,
however, their tax information is included in this study.
Tax Justification
A variety of arguments have been used to justify coal severance taxes.
These arguments have received wide review in academic journals, government publications, and in testimony before state legislatures and Congress." The findings of this study support the literature with respect to
the multiplicity of reasons cited as justifications for the tax.
Responses to the survey questionnaire by state tax commissioners indicate that enhancement of state revenue is the primary motive for state
coal severance taxes. Of the nineteen states that have some type of tax
applicable to coal, thirteen have expressed revenue enhancement as a
justification (Table 1). While coal severance taxes may increase state
revenues, they are a relatively minor tax source. For example, when
comparing coal tax revenue with total state tax revenue, only six states
derive more than one percent of their total revenue from taxes on coal
(Table 4).
Although revenue enhancement is a major motivation, it is often linked
with other reasons justifying the severance tax. Frequently cited reasons
for coal severance taxes are: (1) replacement for loss of natural heritage;'
26. Congress has been unable to impose a federal ceiling on state severance taxes. During debate
over the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No, 96-223, 94 Stat. 299, Congress
was unable to restrict state severance taxes on oil and gas.
27. The states that have enacted coal severance taxes are listed in supra note 4.
28, Ark., Idaho, La. and Nev.
29. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, STATE TAXATION OF MINERAL DEPOSITS AND PRODUCION (1982).
30. C. DUMARS, supra note 7.
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(2) internalization of external costs; 3 (3) transfer of the tax burden;32 and
(4) growth regulation."
Under the "natural heritage theory," depletion of a gift of nature (coal)
belonging to the citizens of a state merits compensation for its irretrievable
loss. 34 Thus, it is argued that a severance tax on coal compensates a state
for loss of this wealth. Six states express "compensation for depletion"
of a nonrenewable resource as a legislative policy justification for their
taxes on coal." 5 Five of the six are western states where coal mining is
a relatively new industry. The sixth state has only experimental lignite
mining operations and had no commerical mines in operation as of 1985.36
Western states may have gained some insight from observing the economic, social, and environmental conditions in the eastern coal fields.
These states have taken steps to mitigate the impact of resource depletion
by creating special trust funds for portions of their tax revenues. Revenues
from these funds can be used for capital development projects at the state
or local level. Montana has established a trust fund to which fifty percent
of all "mine license taxes" on coal are credited. 37 The principal in the
Montana trust fund may be appropriated for use by a three-to-four vote
of the legislature, provided that the principal in the fund remains at or
above $100 million. 8 The State of Wyoming allocates its coal tax revenues
to five separate special purpose accounts and to the general fund.39 One
of these funds, the Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund, is focused on compensation for depletion of the coal resources in that state.
Severance taxes also are viewed as a way to internalize the environmental and social costs associated with coal development. Many of the
costs associated with land disruption, water and air pollution, and the
economic "boom and bust" cycle are not reflected in the price of the
product. These costs are termed "externalities" as they are "external to"
the market price of the product. Seventeen states that have taxes applicable
to coal have expressed "offsetting of economic costs" associated with
31. The "boom town" to "ghost town" cycle in the extractive industries causes social and
economic dislocations and environmental damage that lingers long after the mine closes. Extraction
based taxes may be used to pay for these external costs. For a discussion of this theory see, Schulze,
The Optimal Use ofNon-Renewable Resources: The Theory ofExtraction, I J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT.
53 (1974).
32. For a discussion of tax exporting, see McLure, Economic Constraints on State and Local
Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L. TAX J. 257 (1978); Shelton & Morgan, Resource Taxation,
Tax Exportation and Regional Energy Policies, 17 NAT. RES. J. 261 (1977).
33. The rapid exploitation of energy resources results in accelerating demands for public services.
A. CHURCH, supra note 6, at 12.
34. C. DUMARS, supra note 7.
35. Colo., La., Mont., N.D., S.D. & Wyo., see TABLE I (1984).

36. La.
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-108 (1979).
38. MoT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-203 (5)(1979).
39. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 39-6-305 (1977).
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TABLE I
POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR TAXES ON COAL: 1984.

State

Revenue
Enhancement

Compensation
for
Depletion

Internalize
Economic
Costs

Transfer
Tax
Burden

Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wyoming

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

'RESPONSES FROM STATE TAX OFFICIALS.

coal development as a policy justification (Table 1). These states recognize
the increased costs of government services associated with coal mining
and have used this argument to justify the tax. For example, the State of
Oklahoma allocates all of its coal tax revenues to land reclamation.'
It is also argued that severance taxes are an effective means of shifting
the tax burden to the out-of-state consumers when a state ships coal to
other states.4 ' The Montana coal severance tax is an example of tax
shifting because a high percentage of Montana coal is shipped out of the
state.
Severance taxes may also be used to control the rate of development
of coal resources. Rapid population growth created by the extractive
industry often results in a "bust" cycle as the resource is depleted and
the mine is closed. This may affect the quality of local government
services. 42 This was a concern expressed by the Montana legislature before
the enactment of the thirty percent tax on surface-mined coal. During
legislative hearings a study committee reasoned that:
40. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45 §938 (1987, cum. supp.).
41. Supra note 32.
42. Supra note 31.
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If the coal industry grows somewhat more slowly in Montana, the
small communities in the eastern part of the state will have time to
grow in a more orderly fashion. That the coal industry will continue
to grow with this tax is not doubted by the conference committee."
Although it was speculated that such a tax would halt or reduce coal
production, longitudinal studies are needed to affirm this thesis.
Tax Base
Coal severance taxes are calculated on the basis of either the volume
of coal mined or the value of the coal produced. Eleven states based their
taxes on volume (Table 2). A major limitation of a tax based on volume
is that it does not adjust for changes in inflation unless the tax per unit
volume is periodically increased based on the U.S. Wholesale Price Index;
or some other economic indicator index tied to the inflation rate. During
inflationary periods, states that base tax rates on volume may experience
a decline in the real buying power of their coal tax dollars unless the
state legislatures adjust the rate upward to offset the effects of inflation.
The advantage of taxing coal based on its market value is that the tax
revenues increase as the price of coal increases. Eight states tax coal
based on either gross or net value of the coal produced (Table 2). Of
these, only Alaska, Idaho, and Nevada use a percentage of net value as
the tax rate for coal and other minerals. However, significant amounts
of coal were not being mined in any of these three states as of early 1985.
The remaining five states use a percentage of gross value as a tax rate.
A gross value tax may be preferred by state tax administrators over a net
value tax because it does not tax any value added to the coal through
processing and transportation and it eliminates problems with tax credits
and deductions that are common with net value taxes. Thus, a gross value
tax may be easier to administer than a net value tax.
Tax Revenues
Total state tax collections for fiscal year 1984 amounted to $196.7
billion, an increase of eight percent from 1983." Although the predominant tax source varies from state to state, general sales taxes were the
largest source of state tax revenue in 1984. Sales taxes are the primary
revenue source in twenty-eight states, and the individual income tax is
the main source in eighteen states. 5 The severance tax collections in
Table 3 reflect the taxes imposed on the removal of natural products from
land or water and include coal, oil, gas, other minerals, and timber. While
43. Supra note 13.
44. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1983, TABLE 3 (1984).
45. Id.
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TABLE 2
COAL TAX BASES AND RATES: 1984

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wyoming

Tax
Base

Tax
Rate

Volume
Value
Volume
Volume
Value
Volume
Value
Volume
Volume
Value
Value
Volume
Volume
Volume
Volume
Value
Volume
Value
Value

33.5¢ per ton
7% of net income
10€ per ton
60€ per ton
2%of net value
$1.00 per ton
4.5% of gross value
10€ per ton
150 per ton
30% of gross value
$2.00 per $100 of net value
96.50 per tonb
$1.03 per ton
7¢ per ton
7¢ per ton
4.5% of gross value
35g per ton
3.85% of gross value
10.5% of gross value

'Two counties impose a 40¢ per ton severance tax.
bUnderground mining, 93. 1€ per ton.

TABLE 3
SELECTED MAJOR CATEGORIES OF STATE TAX COLLECTIONS: 1984'
(Millions of Dollars)
Type of Tax

Collections

Sales
Individual Income
Corporate Income
Motor Fuel Sales
License Fees
Severance
Tobacco
Alcohol, Beverage
Other

62,563
58,942
15,511
12,395
11,921
7,240
4,149
2,899
21,175

TOTAL

196,795

Percent Distribution
32
30
8
6
6
4
3
1
10
100

'U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1984, TABLE I (1984).
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TABLE 4
STATE COAL TAX REVENUES: 1984'
(Thousands of Dollars)

State

Total Tax
Revenue

Coal Tax
Revenues

Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wyoming

2,704,250
1,973,252
1,541,361
2,132,825
687,244
1,789,628
2,798,662
3,131,667
3,946,833
583,341
861,115
1,377,444
684,399
7,985,012
2,661,981
358,773
2,511,631
1,713,819
801,537

3,454
b
c
10,379
c
d
191,845
c
1,172
82,824
c
22,019
22,760
1,404
236
c
2,099
176,606
121,133

Percent
<I
1
6
<I
14
2
3
<1
<I
1
12
15

'U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1984 AND
STATE TAX OFFICIALS.
'Not available.
'No commercial mining.
"Effective May 1,1983.

the severance tax is a minor revenue source nationally it is a primary
revenue source in Alaska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wyoming.46
Coal severance taxes are a minor revenue source when compared to

all state tax sources. Only in Kentucky, Montana, West Virginia, and
Wyoming, states with significant coal production, 47 substantial tax rates,

and small populations are significant portions of state revenues derived
from coal severance taxes (Table 4).
In recent years, coal severance taxes have increased in relative importance as state tax sources. All of the states with more than $1 million
in annual coal severance taxes had increases in revenues with the exception of Colorado and Ohio (Table 5). In the four year period 1980 to
1984, West Virginia and Wyoming had revenue increases of more than
46. N.D. increased its sales tax rate in 1983 from 3% to 4%. As a result, the sales tax has become
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1984, TABLE 9

the primary revenue source. U.S.
(1985).

47. These four states provided abouy 47% of total U.S. coal production in 1980. U.S. DEPT. OF
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ENERGY DATA REPORT, TABLE 4 (1980).
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TABLE 5
COAL TAX COLLECTIONS IN SELECTED STATES: 1980 TO 1984*
(Thousands of Dollars)
1984

1980

Percentage

State

Collections

Collections

Change

Alabama
Colorado
Kentucky
Montana
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wyoming

3,454
10,379
191,845
82,824
22,019
22,760
1,404
2,099
176,606
121,133

570
11,132
177,244
75,125
-014,240
2,075
1,954
118,454
42,943

506
-7
8
to
60
-32
7
49
182

TOTAL

634,523

443,737

43

'U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1980 AND
1984 AND STATE TAX OFFICIALS.

$20 million, with Wyoming increasing from $42 million to $121 million
annually.
Tax Revenue Allocation
Of the nineteen states that have taxes which apply to coal, only Alaska48
deposits all of its coal severance tax revenues in the state general fund
and does not share them with local governments. In the remaining states
where coal mines are operating, revenues are split between the general
fund and restricted funds, or are shared with local governments (Table
6).
Twelve states deposit all or a large part of the revenue in restricted
state funds to help mitigate the social and economic costs associated with
coal development and land reclamation or to compensate for the depletion
of a nonrenewable resource. Restricted funds are used to pay for capital
facilities needed for coal development, 49 roads and highways,5" energy
research and development, 5 to aid public schools,52 and to support water
resource development. 3
48. "General fund" means that state account that can be used to provide revenues for any state
service. "Restricted funds" are those accounts which can be used to provide revenues for specific
services designated in the fund. Idaho lists a general fund allocation but has no commercial coal
mining.
49. Alabama State Dock Bulk Handling Facility, ALA. CODE §40-13-5 (1977).
50. Kentucky Road Fund, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143.090 (1986, Cum. Supp.).
51. Montana Alternative Energy Research Development Account, MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35108 (1985).
52. Montana Education Trust Fund, MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-108 (1985).
53. Wyoming Water Development Account, Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 39-6-302 (c) (1977).
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TABLE 6
EXPENDITURE POLICIES FOR COAL SEVERANCE TAX REVENUES: 1984'

General
Fund
(Percent)

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wyoming

State Government
Restricted
Fund
(Percent)

40
100
75

50
b
30
33
91
16

(Percent)
60

50
100
93
50
33

Local Government

25
50
7

50
47
60
25
100
50
100
100
17
3

20
40
25

20
50
97
9

84

*RESPONSES FROM STATE TAX OFFICIALS.
bNo mining.

Twelve states share their coal tax revenues with local units of government. Of these states, Kansas and Kentucky allocate the smallest percentages, seven percent, which may reflect a philosophy that mitigation
of development impacts is a state rather than a local responsibility. Eight
of the twelve states permit unrestricted use of all or part of the shared
funds (Table 7). Six states restrict all or part of the expenditure of funds
to education and to roads. This appears to reflect a belief that local
education and transportation systems are heavily impacted by coal development.
Only one state, Colorado, allocates part of its locally distributed coal
tax revenues for restricted capital improvements unrelated to education
and transportation.'M Fifteen percent of the funds are distributed to counties
and municipalities for capital development expenses and general operating
expenses. All or part of these funds may be used for education or roads,
but they are not restricted to these uses.
54. CoLO.

REV. STAT.

§39-29-110 (1982).

Summer 19871

COAL SEVERANCE TAXATION

TABLE 7
USE OF LOCALLY DISTRIBUTED COAL SEVERANCE TAX REVENUE!

State

Unrestricted
(Percent)

Education
(Percent)

Roads
(Percent)

Alabama
100
Arkansas
50
50
Colorado
85
Kansas
50
50
Louisiana
100
Maryland
54
46
Montana
100
North Dakota
70
30
South Dakota
b
b
Tennessee
50
50
West Virginia
100
'RESPONSES FROM STATE TAX OFFICIALS.
bAllocated by the Board of County Commissioners for school and road purposes.

Other
Capital
Improvements
(Percent)

15

One of the most impacted resources in western coal regions is water.
However, no state earmarks locally distributed coal tax revenues for water
development. This may indicate a legislative philosophy that large water
development projects are best funded and administered at the state and
federal levels of government.
SUMMARY
Among the nineteen states that impose a coal severance tax there is a
wide variation in tax bases, rates, revenues and expenditure policies. Not
one state can be said to have the "best" approach to coal severance
taxation; tax structures generally reflect market conditions, regional conflicts between producing and consuming states, revenue needs, interstate
commerce clause questions, and the relative strengths of various lobbying
groups. While there is substantial diversity in the tax structures, the
following observations can be made about the practices.
Although some of the justifications for coal severance taxes can be
criticized, the fact remains that the tax is an effective way to raise state
revenues. It is usually politically attractive and relatively simple and
inexpensive to administer. When compared with total state revenues,
however, coal severance tax revenues are a minor source of state tax
income. Only in the states of Kentucky, Montana, West Virginia, and
Wyoming do coal severance tax revenues provide more than eight percent
of the total state revenue. In 1984, for example, Kentucky generated the
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largest amount of revenue of all the coal severance tax states, $191 million
dollars, yet this provided only six percent of the total state tax collections.
Coal severance taxes are also justified by a number of states as a way
to compenstate for resource loss or to internalize the external costs associated with coal development. This argument is supported by the allocation of these revenues to state trust or restricted funds, or by sharing
them with local governments. All the states except Alaska followed this
practice, although the percentages of revenues allocated torestricted funds
or to local government vary widely. This is no doubt due to variations
in state economic conditions and public service needs. The allocations
reflect the priorities of the individual states.
Substantial diversity exists among the states in the base upon which
the coal severance tax is calculated and the rate of taxation. Implicit in
this variation are a state's revenue needs and the burden imposed on the
mining industry and consumers. States tax the severance of coal on the
basis of either the volume or the value of coal produced. Each approach
has benefits and shortcomings. The most significant disadvantage of a
volume-based tax is that it does not adjust for changes in price. This is
most apparent during inflationary periods. During periods of falling prices,
however, it is the value-based tax which results in reduced revenues. The
question of tax bases and rates is ultimately a political issue addressed
by state legislatures.

